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Liberal Zionism, Comparative Constitutionalism, and the Project of 
Normalizing Israel 
Nimer Sultany*
In the !rst half of the 1990s two important constitutional laws were enacted by the 
Israeli Knesset - Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation. The enactment of these laws meant that Israel had, for the !rst time, 
a partial bill of rights. Equally novel was the appearance of the phrase “Jewish and 
democratic” with both laws emphasizing in their statement of purpose “the values of 
the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.” 
Whereas the ethnic element was emphatically present, the notion of equality was 
deliberately absent. Behind this absence was the status of the Palestinian minority 
and relations between religious and secular Jews.1 In spite of this glaring omission, 
this came to be known as a “constitutional revolution.” Amnon Rubinstein – law 
professor, former member of the Knesset and minister – is considered to be one of 
the main minds and forces behind it.
The second half of the 1990s witnessed the forceful introduction of the phrase “a state 
for all its citizens,” into the Israeli public debate, mainly by leaders and intellectuals 
of the Palestinian minority. Palestinian citizens of Israel challenged the Jewishness 
of the state and demanded democratization and equality. In reaction to these 
challenges, many Zionists formulated defenses of the “Jewish and democratic” state. 
Others attempted to enact laws and draft constitutions or consensus-formation 
*Nimer Sultany is a Lecturer in Public Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
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1 Yehudit Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, A Biography of Power Struggle, 1(2) MISHPAT UMEMSHAL 
[Law and Government in Israel] 342 (1993) (Hebrew).
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documents that would entrench the Jewish character of the state.
This essay is a critical scrutiny of one recent prominent example of a defense 
aimed at normalizing Israel-Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein’s book 
Israel and the Family of Nations: the Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights (english 
edition, Routledge, 2009). The focus will be on the use of the comparative method 
in the service of this project. As I argue and demonstrate below, this project is, 
!rst, an attempt to escape from the demanding aspects of liberal theory; second, 
a legitimation project; third, it uses functionalism as the comparative method to 
achieve the required result; fourth, it is selective in employing the comparative 
method in order to ensure the lowest common denominator; !fth, it often ignores 
the gap between form and practice; and sixth, it focuses on law-as-text to present 
legal and constitutional arrangements as free from ideological manipulation.  
The Project:
Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein (hereinafter: the authors) clearly have a 
mission: to provide a systematic and comprehensive defense of Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state. Not as an aberration among democracies, that is, a special kind of 
democracy (ethnic democracy), as some Zionists would argue (e.g. Sammy Smooha), 
but as a normal liberal democracy.2 In order to show that a Jewish state can also be 
democratic they do two things: water down Jewishness and water down democracy. 
For the !rst, they argue for a secular understanding of Jewishness. For the second, 
they attempt to demonstrate that Israel’s constitutional structure does not contradict 
existing democratic arrangements in the world. Indeed, having lowered the bar to a 
minimum, they argue that Israel passes the muster and, at times, is even ahead of 
other democracies in its relationship with the Palestinian minority.
The authors explain right at the outset that they refuse to engage with liberal 
democratic theory. By focusing on the practice, rather than the ideal, they want to 
circumvent the demanding aspects of liberal theory. These demanding aspects are, 
for them, “an abstract, radical and rather utopian model of liberal democracy” (p. 4).
In order to show that Israel does not deviate from democratic practice in the world 
as we know it, the authors employ the comparative approach. Dozens of countries 
2 The difference between Smooha and the authors of the book under review is that the former recognizes 
the contradiction between Jewishness and democracy while the latter deny it and maintain that it is merely 
a tension. Both, however, reach similar conclusions: Israel is a democracy (first-rate according to the authors; 
second-rate according to Smooha). Both also use the comparative method and both attitudes lead to the 
conclusion that either few reforms are needed in Israel or none. 
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are mentioned time and again for the purpose of showing that the critiques against 
Israel are unjusti!ed and that they amount to either anti-Zionist propaganda or 
ignorance (p. 198). 
Novelty is not a central characteristic of this book. Indeed, neither the arguments 
made in the book nor the method deployed is original. Many Zionist writers 
have defended Israel on similar grounds,3 and other authors have suggested the 
comparative method.4 Yet, the systematic e"ort and the large number of comparisons 
make the book an interesting case study.      
It also goes without saying that pointing out other cases that might resemble Israel’s 
case in its violation of principles held dearly by liberal democratic theory does not 
make Israel’s case less problematic from the viewpoint of these principles. If John is a 
thief he becomes no less a thief by mentioning ten other thieves.
In addition, the attempt to escape from theory to comparisons is futile. One either 
presupposes a theory or needs to elaborate one for the comparative method to be 
descriptively intelligible and normatively consequential. To compare democracies 
and non-democracies one needs to have an idea of what makes them democracies 
or non-democracies-that is, one needs a theory of democracy. In addition, to 
compare democracies and other regimes for the purpose of evaluating the latter one 
needs to identify the core properties that democracies share and that make them 
identi!able as democracies. It is obvious, to mention one example, that the existence 
of a monarchy in England is not what makes England a democracy. If England is a 
democracy then it is so in spite of the existence of a monarchy, not because of its 
existence. Thus, a monarchical dictatorship cannot be evaluated as a democracy 
by pointing out that democratic England has a queen. Using non-core democratic 
elements as the evaluation measurement is an abuse of the comparative method. A 
regime needs to satisfy the core elements of democracy to qualify as such and these 
elements need to be identi!ed by a theory of democracy.         
The Comparative Method: 
The comparative approach seems well-adapted to the authors’ mission in their 
3 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, The Jewish State: A Justi!cation, in New Essays On Zionism, 3-36 (David Hazony, 
Yoram Hazony, & Michael Oren eds.) ( 2007).
4 See, e.g., Alan Dowty, Is Israel Democratic? Substance and Semantics in the “Ethnic democracy” Debate, 4(2) 
ISR. STUD. 1 (1999). 
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search for a normative validation of Israel through descriptive comparative inquiry. 
Comparativists, David Kennedy argues, are people with projects. They are usually 
driven by the “is” question - “how can I make them understand?” - and they have no 
time for the “ought” question - “what ought to be done?”.5 The comparative approach 
seeks also to depoliticize law by showing it as free from political and ideological 
manipulation.6 Indeed, if similar, or worse, arrangements have been employed and 
justi!ed in other countries, then Israeli arrangements are not peculiar to Zionist 
ideology - other national movements or peoples enforcing their right to self-
determination !nd themselves in a similar position.
Conspicuously, there are di"erent methods of comparing. The authors, however, do 
not defend a deliberate choice of a speci!c method. They seem to assume that their 
way of comparing is self-evident and does not require a defense. To begin with, they 
could have chosen to compare Israel to an in-depth examination of one or several 
countries instead of comparing it to dozens of examples without su#cient and 
careful attention to details. Indeed, most of the discussions of other countries range 
from between one paragraph to several pages. For example, it took the authors one 
paragraph to “refute” the analogy to South African apartheid without any reference 
whatsoever to academic scholarship on the subject (pp. 178-9).7 At other times, 
they lump several states together in one paragraph. Obviously, had they chosen to 
compare Israel to a handful of countries they would have achieved a more limited 
and modest conclusion. The choice of dozens of countries, the authors seem to 
believe, is apt for the task of normalizing Israel by reaching universalizable results, 
i.e., that democracies treat their minorities in a similar manner.   
In addition, the authors-though they do not mention the name-use functionalism 
as their method of comparing. Functionalism, preoccupied as it is with an agenda 
of sameness, seems handy.8 The comparativist looks for the functional equivalent in 
5 David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative law: Comparativism and International Governance, Utah L. 
Rev. 545, 605 (1997).
6 Id. at 615.
7 See, e.g., Daryl J. Glaser, Zionism and Apartheid: A Moral Comparison, 26(3) Ethnic & Racial Stud.  403 (2003); 
John Quigley, Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of Israel, 2 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 221 (1992). Yakobson 
and Rubinstein argue that the Palestinian national movement “never claimed to represent a national entity 
comprising all of the country’s population, including the Jews” (p. 179). This claim con$ates, however, two 
aspects: while the Palestinian national movement as a national liberation movement represented the 
Palestinian Arabs, it did have a “one secular democratic state” project that appealed to all the residents of 
Palestine. Thus, it can be understood as a program for one civic national entity. As I also explain in the text, 
Palestinian or Arab nationality–unlike Jewish nationalism–can be inclusive for di"erent religions or ethnicities. 
8 Günter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals and Ideology–Toward a Layered Narrative, 4(3) 
I-CON 439 (2006).
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other legal systems. She identi!es a human need that the legal system or institutions 
are responding to and then she looks for the institutions that serve the same 
function in di"erent countries. Another similar way of achieving the same goal is 
sometimes called the problem-solving approach: the comparativist identi!es a 
problem that faces di"erent systems, the way they address it and through which 
institutions. Again, it is “the belief that similar problems have similar solutions across 
legal systems, though reached by di"erent routes.”9   
Thus, the choice of comparativism and functionalism presupposes the results the 
authors are seeking to prove. They assume sameness or similarity and, unsurprisingly, 
they arrive at sameness and similarity. Moreover, justifying-by-comparing can be a 
choice between two options: either to justify existing arrangements as permissible 
and acceptable, or to criticize these arrangements by exposing them as mere choices 
(rather than being necessary or natural) and by pointing at other preferable or 
optimal arrangements.10 The authors are clearly concerned with the justi!cation of 
the permissible, i.e. the minimum. They are not looking for the best practices and 
standards against which Israel can be measured. They are seeking to legitimate the 
Israeli constitutional structure and practices by making them look as more natural 
than they really are. Some discriminatory arrangements are “explained” as non-
discriminatory and others are considered the natural order of things. In this sense, 
the book under review is an apology to the existing order and to the status quo.               
The authors’ focus on law-as-text is another method for abstracting power 
con!gurations from ideological domination. While the authors claim they want to 
focus on practice, “practice” turns out to be no more than formal arrangements, as 
it is primarily a collection of quotations and references to written constitutions and 
laws.
On Selectivity:
It is easy to see how the use of comparisons by the authors serves their pre-conceived 
goal. The comparativist chooses the context, the units of analysis, the measure, 
!elds, and objects of comparison. All these presuppose a perspective that is neither 
objective nor disinterested.11 The abuse of the comparative method can be seen 
9 A. Esin Örücü, Methodology of Comparative Law, in 442 Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 443 (Jan M. Smits 
ed.) (2006).
10 Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law 141 (Foundation Press) (2006). 
11 See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L. J. 411 (1985).
96
in many argumentative techniques the authors choose to employ. In some cases 
it seems that their skills in comparative law and politics run out. They refrain from 
further investigation in order to make Israel look better by claiming that it is treating 
the Palestinian minority fairly and tolerantly in spite of the “unprecedented” situation 
“in the history of modern democracies” in which this minority’s leaders sympathize 
openly with the enemy (p. 111).
The selectivity in using documents is another demonstration of the abuse of 
the comparative method. For instance, they mention the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) (p. 119). They could 
have also chosen to mention the International Labor Organization’s Convention (No. 
169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) 
or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). Their choice of 
the Framework document rather than these two documents is motivated by their 
(rhetorical) classi!cation of the Palestinian minority as primarily a national minority 
rather than indigenous minority. The documents on indigenous peoples would 
allow more self-government rights than the authors would support and more than 
Israel grants the Palestinian citizens. The authors could have also mentioned the 
rights granted to the Sami people in the Scandinavian countries. Yet the authors are 
concerned mainly with anti-discrimination (often practiced in cases of immigrants), 
rather than with imposing positive duties on the state to ensure collective rights.
Moreover, in their rejection of meaningful collective rights for Palestinian citizens 
inside Israel, the authors claim that Palestinian national rights are exhausted with the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. The authors, however, do not mention cases in 
which the existence of a nation state (such as Germany or France) does not preclude 
the recognition of collective rights and autonomy of minorities related to these 
states in culture and language in other states (such as the cantons in Switzerland or 
Québec in Canada). German, French and Italian languages are recognized as o#cial 
languages in Switzerland, despite the existence of nation-states in which these 
languages are also state languages.       
This selectivity is also apparent in the narrative of progress that the authors advance, 
i.e. that the conditions of the Palestinian citizens are getting better and the gaps 
between Jews and Arabs are being bridged (p. 113). Although they acknowledge 
the gap between formal equality and the materialization of equality, they quote the 
rhetoric of some rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court in passing, without rigorous 
academic examination of these rulings, and they completely ignore the critiques 
voiced by other academics against these rulings that expose their limitations and 
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shortcomings (as in the Q’adan case).12 They also do not present other rulings 
of the Court that might be inconsistent with this image of progressive evolution. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling justifying the amendment to the Citizenship Law that 
bans family uni!cation between an Israeli citizen and a Palestinian resident of the 
Occupied Territories or a citizen of other Arab and Muslim countries is a case in point. 
Neither the law itself, which clearly discriminates against Palestinian citizens, nor the 
ruling of the Court is mentioned by the authors.13 It might be argued in the authors’ 
defense that the ruling (2006) was a development that occurred after the publication 
of the book in Hebrew and thus it cannot be expected that the English translation 
would include it. This argument, however, is unconvincing. Indeed, the law itself 
was enacted in 2003, after the book was published in Hebrew in the same year. 
Nevertheless, the authors found it important to update the English edition of their 
book by mentioning the appointment of the !rst Arab minister in the Israeli cabinet 
in 2007. Thus, their ability to update was clearly motivated only by introducing facts 
that seem to support the “progress” and “closing the gaps” thesis. In addition, it is 
striking to discover that the authors do not mention a watershed event such as the 
October 2000 protests, in which the Israeli police killed 13 Palestinian demonstrators. 
Subsequent developments, in which the report by the o#cial commission of inquiry 
was ignored and the legal system granted impunity to the policemen, are also not 
mentioned. These and many other events, developments and court rulings do 
not !t the progress narrative and so are considered by the authors as unworthy of 
discussion.                
Furthermore, the authors ignore the gap between formal constitutional and legal 
pronouncements or institutional arrangements on the one hand, and practice and 
constitutional and political history of the country in question on the other hand. In 
fact they often doubly ignore it: for Israel and for the compared state. An illustration 
of this point is the comparison between Israel and England in questions of religion. 
The authors are defending Israel against the claim that the role that religion plays in 
the Israeli legal and political system contradicts democratic principles. By repeatedly 
pointing at England, they claim that democracies can tolerate some relationship with 
religion without forgoing democracy, and that Israel is no exception (p. 134). Yet, 
12 See, e.g., Hassan Jabareen, The Future of Arab Citizenship in Israel: Jewish-Zionist Time in a Place With No 
Palestinian Memory, in Challenging Ethnic Citizenship 196 (Daniel Levy and Yifaat Weiss eds., 2002); Gad 
Barzilai, Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics, and the Israel-Arab-Palestinian 
Community, 34 Isr. L. Rev. 425 (2000).  
13 One of the authors defended a version of this law elsewhere. See Amnon Rubinstein and Liav Orgad, 
Human Rights, National Security and Jewish Majority: The Case of Marriage Migration, 35 HAPRAKLIT 315 
(2006) [Hebrew] 
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Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between religious-tolerant states and secular-tolerant 
states. Israel is a religious-tolerant state, i.e. a state that endorses one monotheistic 
religion but is in principle tolerant to other religions. The secular-tolerant state, 
as in France, is a secular-tolerant state in which religion is relegated to the private 
sphere. England, according to Dworkin, is formally a religious-tolerant state, but in 
practice a secular-tolerant state.14 Thus, the authors make their life easy by ignoring 
practice in England to be able to justify the practice of Israel by virtue of England’s 
formal arrangement. One could have used the authors’ logic to justify the Moroccan, 
Jordanian and Saudi monarchies by referring to the monarchies in England or 
Denmark. 
Security and Thin Scholarship:            
In their statement of Israel’s situation, the authors rehash journalistic accounts 
of security conditions in 1948 and 1967 that have been refuted by many scholars. 
Indeed, they do not see any need to engage with authors like Benny Morris, Tom 
Segev and Ilan Pappe in their historiography.15 This choice is another indication of 
the impoverished level of scholarship the authors demonstrate.16 Indeed, they seem 
to be replying to arguments mostly made in the media, rather than engaging in a 
serious examination of well-argued academic works. The main books written about 
the Palestinian minority by authors like Ian Lustick, Elia Zureik, Nadim Rouhana and 
David Kretzmer are totally ignored. In discussing some of Edward Said and Azmi 
Bishara’s ideas, they quote two interviews each one of them made separately to 
HAARETZ. The fact that Said and Bishara are proli!c writers with academic publications 
escaped the authors’ attention. Similarly, their repeated rejection of bi-nationalism 
does not include a discussion of the wealth of scholarship defending this position.       
14 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 57 (2006). 
15 The authors mention only one article by Pappe, but not his main books. 
16 Many of the assertions made by the authors are unsupported. For instance, they claim that the “gap 
between immigrant Muslim community and majority society in Western European countries is greater…
than its equivalent in Israel.” (p. 114). The skeptical reader !nds no support for this claim. Note here that 
the authors, notwithstanding their claim that the Palestinian minority is a national minority, compare it to 
immigrant communities in Europe. Similarly, the authors claim that “one of the salient cultural di"erences 
between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority is that the latter is, on the whole, considerably more 
religious than the former” (p. 183). The authors provide no support for this assertion and do not explain 
what do they mean by religious (e.g. whether it includes conservative and traditional attitudes). They also 
commit the mistake of essentialism by elevating historical and socio-economical contingencies into cultural 
di"erences. A third example is the claim that the Arab parties in the Knesset “endorsed” the “future vision” 
documents (p. 150). This unsupported assertion is factually mistaken.       
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Interestingly, the authors do not present notorious examples of measures taken 
by some states under emergency conditions or in the name of security in order to 
criticize democracies and their deviation from democratic ideals and constitutional 
guarantees-rather, they present them in order to justify Israel’s practices (p. 105). The 
message is: the fact that Israel is under tough security conditions excuses some of its 
discriminatory practices, since this is what democracies do under similar conditions. 
Thus, the fact that Israel has practiced such discrimination does not entail the 
conclusion that it does not belong to the family of democratic states. The authors 
distinguish between peace-time standards and war-time standards. The comparison 
between the Palestinian minority’s status and other minorities in peaceful democratic 
countries, they argue, is unwarranted since Israel is not under similar conditions 
(pp. 117-8). That, however, does not prevent the authors from making these very 
comparisons when they think that Israel can be shown in a bright light. Indeed, they 
argue that in spite of these tough conditions, Zionism and Israel have managed to 
maintain “universalist ideals” (p. 95). 
Nationality and Immigration:
The authors repeatedly assume or imply that there is no di"erence between the 
designation “Jewish” and the designation “Palestinian” or “Arab”. Accordingly, the 
rejection of the Jewishness of Israel is inconsistent with the acceptance of the 
Arab-ness of an Arab state or the Palestinian-ness of Palestine (pp. 4, 45-6, 118). 
Yet the identity Arab and Palestinian does not overlap with one religion, as does 
Jewishness. Indeed, the identity can include any religious a#liation without any 
need for conversion for purposes of joining the political community. To the extent 
that some Arab states make Islam the o#cial religion of the state they are clearly 
violating democratic principles and best practices. The comparison to Arab states is 
interesting, since it is not obvious how this comparison would support the authors’ 
conclusion that Israel is a normal democratic state. It is palpable then that the authors 
are determined to use any comparison that will make Israel look better.
The authors, however, also compare Israel to western democracies. Contrariwise, 
other Zionist writers have been more forthcoming on the di"erence between the 
membership of the Jewish people and other nationalities and on the role of religion 
in this identity even for secular Jews: 
“the Jewish conception of nationhood that sought embodiment in a Jewish 
state is, in itself, uniquely pointed and restrictive in character. Few other 
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Western national movements accord such a pivotal role to the religious 
component in their national identity. Far more potently than, say, the 
identi!cation of Polish or French national membership with Catholicism, 
Jewish national consciousness-even for aggressively secular Jews-is 
indissociable from the Jewish religion. Were a Frenchman to abandon 
Catholicism to become a Protestant, his French identity would not be 
fundamentally jeopardized.”17        
Tenuous comparisons pervade the book. In comparing Israel with states like 
Macedonia (p. 154), India (p. 159) and Spain (p. 169), the authors repeatedly ignore 
the fact that majorities in these countries are not recent immigrant communities, as is 
the case with the Jewish majority in Israel. And in their comparison between the Law 
of Return and other repatriation measures by European states they ignore the fact 
that in most of the cases to which they refer the majority of the nation maintained 
a presence in the homeland, already resides in the state and only a minority of the 
people is addressed by these measures. Yet in Israel’s case, most of the people are 
outside the state, the right of return as expressed by the Law of Return is understood 
as constitutive of the state, the Law is also required to maintain the Jewish majority 
inside the state, and the Law is clearly ideological as it considers even those who 
were born inside Israel as Jews who exercised their right to immigrate to Israel. The 
importance of the Law of Return to Israel is clearly not paralleled by the repatriation 
measures taken by some states. Including the Law under the notion of repatriation is 
thus misleading. The authors do not distinguish between “maintaining connections” 
with compatriots and preserving majority status. The former seems more defensible 
than the latter. Furthermore, they suggest a tenuous distinction between immigration 
preferential policies that are directed against a group, such as non-whites, which are 
illegitimate; and policies privileging a speci!c group with “a genuine connection” to 
the country in question (p. 126). This distinction is supposed to make the Australian 
White-only immigration policy in the 1970s unjusti!ed while the Israeli Jew-only 
fast-track to citizenship justi!ed. Yet, if one uses the authors’ arguments defending 
the Law of Return (pp. 125-6), one can easily argue in favor of the White-only policy 
in that it does not discriminate against citizens, but is directed outward to the Whites 
of the world. Of course, the Law of Return does have discriminatory e"ects inward: it 
a"ects the demographic status by ensuring Jewish dominance, and the two paths to 
17 Bernard Susser and Eliezer Don Yehiya, Israel and the Decline of the Nation-State in the West, 14(2) MODERN 
JUDAISM 187, 192 (1994). 
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citizenship and naturalization of spouses (Jews and non-Jews) clearly in$uence the 
distribution of resources among citizens by granting faster citizenship accompanied 
with economic bene!ts to Jews and their spouses or relatives.18 Needless to say, the 
category “White” is wider and less restrictive than the category “Jew,” since “White” 
is not necessarily associated with religion or conversion. A more apt category for 
analogy would be “White Catholic” or “White Evangelical.”  
Inconsistency and Beauti!cation:                   
The authors do not seem to be aware of the inconsistency in their arguments. When 
the Jews were a minority in Palestine the authors defend the minority’s right to self-
determination in a state and hence partition. Yet, when the Palestinians became 
a minority inside the new state of Israel the authors reject the minority’s right to 
self-government in a (cultural) autonomy and they justify current Israeli policies, 
although they would recommend o#cial recognition as a national minority. This 
recognition, however, is merely formal since it does not entail, say, control over the 
Arab education system (p. 121). This double-standard in argumentation is striking 
given the fact that one can accept the arguments mentioned by the authors as 
supporting the Jewish right to self-determination (such as special connection with 
Palestine, no-other-homeland, and victims of a catastrophe) and see them also in 
the Palestinian minority’s case. Arguably, applying minority standards (especially as 
immigrants) on Jews pre-1948 could lead the authors (if they were consistent) to 
reject statehood and, thus, partition.
Similarly, the book relies heavily in its opening chapters on UN partition resolution 
181. If one accepts the legitimacy of the international structure of power and UN 
resolutions, then one should explain the selectivity in supporting some resolutions 
rather than others. UN resolution 194 relating to the Palestinian refugees is not even 
mentioned by the authors. In fact, the authors repeatedly exonerate Israel from any 
responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem.          
In the hands of the authors, many exclusive measures become, in an a-historical 
fashion, inclusive. Thus, the ethnocentric language of the Declaration of 
Independence in which Arab citizens are not part of the nation, establishing the 
state is an indication of recognition of the Arabs as a national minority (pp. 118-9).19 
18 See also Chaim Gans, the Limits of Nationalism 125 (2003).
19 Orit Kamir, The Declaration has Two Faces: The Interesting Story of the ‘Zionist Declaration of Independence’ 
and the ‘Democratic Declaration of Independence,’ 23 IYONI MISHPAT [Tel Aviv University Law Review] 473 
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Likewise, they mention repeatedly the o#cial status given to Arabic as if it is another 
indication of recognition of collective identity (p. 151). Yet they ignore the fact that 
this was the arrangement under the mandate, in which English, Arabic and Hebrew 
were all recognized as o#cial languages. Israel only incorporated this arrangement 
with one change (annulling the status of English). The authors also ignore that this 
o#cial status is largely ignored and unimplemented. The main case in which the 
Supreme Court discussed and recognized Arab language rights on signs in mixed 
cities was based neither on the o#cial status of Arabic (except for one judge) nor on 
any recognition of collective language rights. Indeed, it seems that the motivation 
for this recognition in formal law was to delineate between the communities so that 
they will not assimilate into each other and facilitate the control of the Arab minority. 
The movement restrictions in the military administration period, the oppressive 
measures against Arab national movements, the separation between the Arab and 
Jewish education systems (p. 153), the lack of civil marriage, and the monopoly of 
religious authorities on personal status can all be seen as exclusive measures.20 Yet, 
in the hands of the authors some of them become well-meaning and generous 
arrangements. Similarly, Zionist intentions and plans towards the Palestinian natives, 
speci!cally those who would become citizens, are no less beauti!ed by selective 
quotations from Zionist leaders and authors (chapter 2). These can be questioned 
not only by bringing to the fore other quotes that are prevalent in writings critical of 
Zionism21 but also in research that shows the less pleasant practices.22 Furthermore, 
Ian Lustick has argued that these Zionist statements were only tactical.23 This 
orientation of beauti!cation continues in their statements of more recent events 
such as their claim that Ariel Sharon’s government accepted the Road Map (p. 64). 
The fact that Sharon’s government had fourteen reservations that virtually emptied 
the Road Map of much of its content is ignored.
(2000) (Hebrew) (analyzing the ethnic and exclusionary character of the Declaration, noting that the 
Declaration denies the possibility that Palestine is the birthplace of an Arab national identity.) See also Yoram 
Shachar, The Earlier Drafts of the Declaration of Independence, 26(2) IYONI MISHPAT 523 (2002) (Hebrew) (an 
historical account of the di"erent drafts of the Declaration, noting that the word democracy did not survive 
in the !nal draft).
20 The literature on the control of the Arab minority through the education system is well-known. See, e.g., 
Majid Al-Haj, Education, empowerment and Control: the Case of the Arabs in Israel (1995). 
21 For example, the authors quote from Theodor Herzl’s novel Altneuland, suggesting that he had “pioneering 
overtones in terms of equal rights for the ‘Other’” (p. 89). Yet, other quotes from the same novel can easily 
show that Herzl had adopted degrading European imperialist representations of non-European natives.   
22 Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism 1917-1948 (2009).
23 Ian Lustick, Arabs In The Jewish State: Israel’s Control Of A National Minority 32-33, 36-37, 39-40 (1980).
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Misunderstanding Liberalism:          
The last chapter of the book is concerned with the question of neutrality of the state 
towards its citizens and the possibility of inclusive state identity. This chapter, the 
longest in the book, is rather confusing. The authors seek to collapse the distinction 
between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism by trying to show that states that 
embrace civic nationalism are actually not neutral and are therefore ethnic states no 
less than Israel. However, in the course of doing so, the authors demonstrate both a 
misunderstanding of liberal theory and a misunderstanding of the critique of liberal 
theory. 
They construct a straw man they call neutrality that does not really correspond to 
neutrality as understood by prominent liberal authors (pp. 141-2). They seem to 
suggest, if taken to their absurd logical conclusions, that the neutrality required by 
liberal theory would mean assigning numbers instead of names to states, since this 
would be the only way the state would be neutral in its name. Or that any language 
is non-neutral and so being neutral would mean that a computer language should 
be used in communication between citizens who belong to di"erent languages, 
ethnicities and descents. If state names and language are non-neutral, then liberal 
neutrality is impossible and should be abandoned. 
In making or implying such arguments, the authors make no e"ort to distinguish 
between di"erent kinds of non-neutrality. The authors clearly con$ate an argument 
that Liberalism makes (neutrality, i.e. impartiality, towards competing conceptions 
of the good, such as in religions) and an argument it does not make (neutrality in 
absolute terms). Liberal theory is neutral with respect to citizens’ choice between 
Islamic, Christian and Jewish ways of life, but it is not neutral with respect to a 
political regime that is based on religion (as in a Christian, Islamic or Jewish state). 
The latter is ruled out in liberal theory from the company of legitimate liberal 
democratic regimes.  One can accept the argument that an o#cial language of the 
state is not a neutral choice but need not accept a conclusion that the state can also 
have an o#cial religion, since it cannot be neutral anyway. For liberal theory, only 
the latter is clearly illegitimate from a neutrality-of-the-good point of view. One can 
also accept the argument that some national identities include religious elements 
and traditions and that these might be dominant by virtue of a majority status, but 
need not proceed to conclude that these elements should be institutionalized or 
that discrimination in naturalization processes is permissible as well. One can also 
accept the authors’ argument that “Israeli” is not neutral and yet maintain that it is 
more neutral than “Jewish state.” The authors are in fact suggesting an absurd claim: 
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if you recognize that the state $ag and language are not neutral, which they are 
not from the perspective of the Palestinian minority, then that should lead you to 
accepting the Law of Return and the maintenance of a Jewish majority. They do not 
seem to recognize, as I am suggesting here, that there is a long walk between these 
two poles. 
Consider the example of Spain (p. 168). The authors argue that the state identity is 
inclusive but not neutral, especially since the state faces national demands by some 
groups. How does this justify forgoing an inclusive identity, even if non-neutral, 
towards embracing an exclusive identity? Israel is exclusive both in identity and in 
practice. An argument that Spain is not neutral or even exclusive in its practice does 
not lead to the position that it should be even more non-neutral and exclusive.                
Liberal theory, however, is not as absurd as the authors suggest (without caring to 
support their argument by engaging with liberal authors). John Rawls distinguishes 
between four stages: the hypothetical original position, in which representatives 
arrive at a political conception of justice behind a veil of ignorance that hides 
from them morally irrelevant facts; the constitutional convention, in which the 
principles of justice of the political conception of justice are applied in the process 
of establishing a constitutional regime that includes a bill of rights that Rawls calls 
“constitutional essentials”; the legislative stage, in which legislation should comply 
with the constitutional essentials; and !nally the interpretive stage, in which judges 
interpret legislation. Neutrality, accordingly, is fully guaranteed only in the original 
position, in which the principles of justice are chosen. Thus, only the basic structure 
of the well-ordered society (a society in which all citizens a#rm these principles of 
justice) and the constitutional essentials are required to be neutral. Therefore, the 
name of the state, the language of the majority, the anthem, the $ag and other 
symbols are not necessarily a"ected by these restrictions, since they are neither part 
of the basic structure (which includes the major political and economic institutions) 
nor part of the constitutional essentials.   
In addition, Rawls distinguishes between neutrality in aim (the basic structure 
and public policy are not to be intended to favor any conception of the good) and 
neutrality in e"ect (the state should refrain from any policies that might facilitate 
and encourage the adoption of a speci!c conception of the good by citizens). Only 
the !rst is demanded by Rawlsian liberal theory. The latter, he says, is impractical 
and thus is not required by liberal theory. State neutrality towards the good does 
not mean that, in e"ect, some conceptions of the good bene!t more from the basic 
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structure and are able to recruit more adherents than others.24 Obviously, a majority 
will bene!t more as it will be the dominant culture. So long as the state does not 
become committed to the majority’s conception of the good and the basic structure 
and constitutional essentials are not tilted to serve it, Rawls would not complain. 
The authors, it goes without saying, have no time for an inquiry into the meaning of 
neutrality in liberal theory or for such distinctions.
Misunderstanding the Critique of Liberalism:
It is the very fact that there is no neutrality in e"ect (that Rawls would not deny) 
that motivates Will Kymlicka’s project. The authors, however, misunderstand the 
critique of neutrality in liberal theory as they seem to understand this critique to be 
an argument for group-di"erentiated rights as a substitute for equality, rather than 
as complementary to equality and inclusive identity of the state. In other words, they 
understand it as an argument allowing privileging majorities.  
Their use of Kymlicka’s theory is instructive of their selective and inaccurate 
appropriation of theories, case-studies and arguments. They seem to forget 
that Kymlicka starts from the recognition of the non-neutrality of state symbols 
and language in order to argue for special group rights for disadvantaged and 
underprivileged minorities to compensate them and enable them to obtain real 
equality. Indeed, equality is one of the main justi!cations that Kymlicka provides for 
group rights. Accordingly, for the state to treat all citizens equally it should redress 
the disadvantages su"ered by minorities. Group rights granted to minorities do not 
mean forgoing an inclusive identity or formal equality in the law; rather they are a 
supplement to it. Immigrants (ethnic groups) should be provided with access to the 
mainstream culture so they can integrate and national groups should have access to 
their own culture. Kymlicka’s theory does not justify majorities in either preventing 
integration of willing minority members or discriminating against national minorities 
who seek to preserve their culture. Yet the authors seem to suggest that the only 
sense of inclusive civic identity is the assimilationist model (which is not correct as 
far as Kymlicka is concerned) (p. 180). Thus, they seem to suggest that the French 
model that refuses to recognize minorities is the only model for civic nationalism. 
Yet Kymlcika is clear: he criticizes German and Afrikaner arrangements vis-à-vis 
membership in the nation: “Such descent-based approaches to national membership 
24 John Rawls, Political Liberalism 193-4 (1993). For a similar position see Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: 
The theory and practice of Equality 154, 282-3 (2000). 
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have obvious racist overtones, and are manifestly unjust. It is indeed one of the tests 
of a liberal conception of minority rights that it de!nes national membership in terms 
of integration into a cultural community, rather than descent. National membership 
should be open in principle to anyone...”25 Had the authors used Kymlicka because 
they really found his theory convincing they would have found it di#cult to be 
reconciled with supporting preference to Jews and the Law of Return.       
Kymlicka distinguishes between self-government rights that should be granted to 
national minorities and polyethnic rights that are given to immigration minorities. 
As we saw above, the authors would reject any self-government rights-delegation 
of powers to the minority, federalism, or autonomy-for the Palestinian minority. All 
they are willing to concede is rhetorical: an o#cial recognition as a national minority. 
The reason is obvious: by recognizing Palestinian citizens as a national minority, the 
authors think that they can have a better case for the Jewishness of the state. First, by 
recognizing the Palestinians as such they are not faced with the demand to assimilate; 
an assimilation that the Jewish majority does not want to o"er for a large minority.26 
Second, once recognized as a national minority it is easy to point out the connection 
between them and their nation cross the border. What follows is the argument that 
rejecting meaningful collective rights for the minority and justifying privileges to the 
majority are rationalized by the fact that Palestinian national aspirations are to be 
realized in the Palestinian state.27 Kymlicka would have been surprised to see this 
appropriation of his views: instead of recognizing the Palestinian citizens as a national 
minority in order to grant them national collective rights, they are recognized only 
in order to strip them of such rights. What starts, at face value, as a well-meaning 
position turns out to be no more than a justi!cation for denying rights.
Justifying their rejection of civic nationalism, or the “composite national identity” 
model, the authors seek to distinguish the Israeli case from cases like the United 
Kingdom and Spain (p. 181). The di"erence for them is that the Spanish or the 
English were territorially concentrated, lived together for centuries and in spite of 
periods of antagonism experienced cooperation. On the contrary, Arabs and Jews 
see themselves as di"erent peoples, they are involved in a bloody con$ict, they have 
a#nities with groups outside the state borders, Palestinian citizens are not territorially 
concentrated, and Jews fear an Arab majority in a bi-national state solution. If one 
25 Will Kymlicka, multicultural citizenship: A Liberal Theory Of Minority Rights 23 (1996).
26 Curiously, the authors obscure this fact and present the argument as if it is solely concerned with the 
wishes of the Arab minority to preserve its identity. 
27 See a similar argument regarding the Law of Return in Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 160 (1993). 
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looks, however, from the perspective of the Spanish citizen in the time of the civil war, 
that is, the perspective of the participant (people living through di#cult times), then 
one might conclude that there is no way to foster an all-encompassing nationality. 
This, however, is refuted by subsequent developments. Similarly, the collapse of the 
white regime in South Africa after decades of brutal oppression of blacks did not 
result in wide-scale atrocities against whites. So the authors are reifying the concrete 
historical moment, as they understand it, by seeing only the synchronic point of view. 
They seem to ascribe no signi!cance to historical developments over time. They also 
reify identities as if they were immutable rather than recognizing their $uidity. It 
is also unclear why ties with outside communities should prevent civic identity (it 
depends what kind of ties one asks for), other than the stubborn refusal to accept or 
even imagine such a civic identity.  
The Impact of Occupation:            
Tellingly, the Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is rarely 
mentioned in the book. The authors say that they support the withdrawal from 
these territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Yet, in discussing 
the democratic character of the state, they seem to assume or suggest that the 
occupation has no e"ect on Israel-proper and its democratic credentials. Indeed, 
the Association for Civil Rights in Israel issued a statement suggesting that a state 
cannot be democratic when it denies millions of people basic rights in a prolonged 
occupation.28 Israel has been an occupying power throughout most of its history 
and its occupation is becoming one of the longest military occupations since World 
War II. In a book subtitled “The Jewish nation-state and human rights,” one would 
have expected some discussion of the non-democratic practices and violations of 
international law. Such discussion, however, is absent from the book and reports by 
Israeli, Palestinian and international human rights organizations are not mentioned. 
This absence is question-begging and particularly striking in cases like the rejection 
of the analogy to South African apartheid. Clearly this analogy is mostly employed 
in reference to Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. Without discussing and 
refuting these underpinnings of the analogy it is unclear how the authors can 
describe the analogy as “propagandistic” and “deplorable” (p. 179). Indeed, this 
excess of language without discussing the merits of the analogy makes the book 
“propagandistic” rather than an academic or scholarly work.
28 A Democracy on Paper Only?, available at: http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/democlong.pdf (Hebrew) (June 
2007); a short description in English is available at: http://www.acri.org.il/eng/print.aspx?id=319. 
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On Liberal Zionism:
In the !nal analysis, the so-called liberal Zionist is someone who equates spuriously 
between the nationalism of the settlers and the nationalism of the natives. These 
are both legitimate nationalisms with just claims, the authors maintain, and the 
resolution of the con$ict should be in the form of two states since this is the only 
solution that embodies this equivalence (pp. 9, 58, 70).29 The liberal Zionist endorses 
some future-oriented form of distributive justice.30 While he might acknowledge 
some of the historical injustices made to the Palestinian minority (p. 95), including on 
the land issue, he will see the Q’adan decision as the resolution of these injustices (pp. 
3-4) and does not consider or suggest a redistribution of lands that would address 
these injustices, such as the return of Palestinian citizens to their expropriated land. 
By being future-oriented, this position presupposes the legitimacy of the Zionist 
project and the facts it created on the ground. The liberal Zionist position would 
support inclusion in the Jewish-Zionist structure as it already exists. For this inclusion 
to be possible, Palestinian citizens should be stripped from national collective 
demands and aspirations that contradict or impede the Zionist project or would 
cast a doubt on its legitimacy. The rejection of meaningful recognition of national 
rights for an indigenous Palestinian minority is thus essential to presenting Israel as 
a normal nation-state.    
The liberal Zionist is able to claim being both a liberal and a Zionist because his 
liberalism takes reality as a given, rather than man-made, and the community as a 
pre-ordained fact. Thus, in order to be a liberal the Zionist presupposes the conditions 
for the existence of a Jewish majority in Palestine. Zionism, however, is by itself the 
very project of creating these conditions, i.e. transforming the Palestinian-Arab 
homeland into a Jewish homeland by altering the demographic reality (from an Arab 
majority to a Jewish majority) and the concomitant alteration of the geography of 
the place. Only now can the liberal Zionist o"er the Palestinians rights in the Jewish 
homeland. Thus, the liberal Zionist presupposes 1948 and the injustice done to the 
Palestinians. Whether by partition, ethnic cleansing or massive $eeing-the dirty work 
has been done by others. Only post-1948 can he really exist. Post-1948 all he needs 
to claim is that the privileges given to the majority are derived from the right to 
self-determination of majorities or the e"ect thereof. The return of the Palestinian 
refugees inside Israel will change the community and so will make it impossible for 
29 See also Tamir, supra note 27, at 82.
30 See also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (Article 10: “This Basic Law shall not a"ect the validity of 
any law (din) in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law”).
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the liberal Zionist to exist. Thus, only with the preservation of the results of 1948 
will he be able to continue to exist. The maintenance of injustice is necessary for the 
liberal Zionist to subsist. 
Academic and intellectual rationalizations and legitimations of injustice abound. The 
book reviewed here is a case in point.      
